The lessons learned in North Africa were three fold:
• Army and Air Headquarters should be co-located for effective cooperation.
• Dedicated wireless communication links were provided so that reports from reconnaissance aircraft of for example, 'targets of opportunity' could be acted upon swiftly and so that requests from forward troops for air support could also to be answered quickly and accurately. Air Support Signal Units were formed to provide these communications.
• Fighter—bombers and, later, rocket firing fighters, were an exceptionally flexible and powerful weapon system that could be used to attack, for example, airfields, railways and road convoys well behind enemy lines as well as tanks, artillery positions and other enemy installations holding up the Army's advance.

The 8th Army and the Desert Air Force provided the template for Operation Overlord. The Desert Air Force was also known as the 1st Tactical Air Force (1 TAF) and so plans were put in place to form a 2nd Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) to support the invasion of NW Europe. It was appreciated that the bulk of the aircraft needed by 2 TAF would be in Fighter Command so the first move, on June 1st, 1943, was to 1 transfer 2 (Light Bomber) Group from Bomber Command to Fighter Command. Two weeks later Army Cooperation Command ceased to exist and its assets (which included tactical reconnaissance aircraft) were also transferred to Fighter Command. Three groups (earmarked to eventually form part of 2 TAF) were initially set up within this enlarged command, 2 Group, equipped with light bombers, 83 & 84 Groups equipped with squadrons of Spitfires, Hurricanes and Typhoon fighter-bombers to support 2nd (British) Army and 1st (Canadian) Army which, together, formed 21st Army Group.

In an unpopular measure the ground crew and maintenance staff were withdrawn from the squadrons. A series of numbered airfields were established, pairs of airfields forming sectors. These numbered airfields included a basic headquarters [Staff plus the ground crew and servicing personnel. These 'airfields' were intended to, be fully mobile and to host whatever squadrons flew into them. Airfields were to be capable of operating for indefinite periods from forward landing strips and all personnel had to become familiar with 'life under canvas'.
The numbered airfields were later re-designated wings (most of 84 Group’s numbered airfields being re-designated in November 1943) retaining their number thus 132 Airfield became 132 Wing on 1st November 1943.

Squadrons rarely remained at one location for long although the Wing Headquarters may have been a little more stable in the UK. The squadrons of Auster AOP aircraft were even more 'mobile' and very much 'free spirits' moving freely from place to place and from group to group.